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Asset-backed securitization transactions have become a widely
favored method of corporate finance.' Companies securitize every-
thing from the mundane accounts receivable, credit card receivables,
and loan receivables,2 to the more exotic music royalties,3 taxicab me-
dallions , and unpaid real estate taxes. While there are many reasons
to securitize,6 the ability to eliminate bankruptcy risk to the creditor
ranks as one of the most prominent.
7
In a regular unsecured lending arrangement, one of the primary
risks the unsecured lender faces is that the borrower will go bankrupt
and the lender will have a subordinate claims over the remaining as-
sets in the borrower's bankruptcy estate. Even in a regular secured
lending arrangement, the lender risks enduring a lengthy and costly
bankruptcy process before being able to claim possession of collat-
eral. These risks can be substantially eliminated by a securitization
that is structured through a special purpose vehicle ("SPy") to create
t B.A. 1998, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 2001, The University of Chicago.
1 See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 Tex L
Rev 595,601-03 (1998) (listing cash flows that have been securitized, including mortgages, auto
loans, credit card receivables, hotel receivables, taxi cab medallions, health care receivables, and
government contract receivables); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L J 1, 24
(1996) ("Asset securitization is by far the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. credit mar-
kets.").
2 LoPucki, 106 Yale L J at 25 (cited in note 1).
3 See Jennifer Burke Sylva, Comment, Bowie Bonds Sold for Far More Than a Song: The
Securitization of Intellectual Property as a Super-Charged Vehicle for High Technology Financing,
15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J 195,200-06 (1999) (discussing how performer David
Bowie issued bonds backed by his future music royalties).
4 Lupica,76 Tex L Rev at 602 (cited in note 1).
5 Id.
6 See id at 605 (listing benefits such as "improving liquidity, increasing diversification of
funding sources, lowering the effective interest rate, improving risk management, and achieving
accounting-related advantages").
7 Id at 648 ("[ilt is the transaction's bankruptcy-remote feature that has attracted [1996's]
market to invest over one hundred billion dollars in asset-backed securities.").
8 With a subordinate claim, the unsecured creditor is only entitled to the money remain-
ing in the bankruptcy estate after the secured creditors' claims are satisfied in full. See 11 USC
§§ 506-07 (1994).
9 11 USC § 362(a)(3) (1994) provides that any attempt by a creditor to gain possession of
collateral is stayed during the bankruptcy proceeding.
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a bankruptcy-remote true sale.' This type of securitization treats a
company's asset-backed capital financing as an outright sale of assets
rather than a secured loan." In effect, a lender is no longer a true
creditor holding a security interest in the company's securitized assets.
Instead, the lender becomes a property owner of these assets.
By structuring a securitization as a true sale, the securitized assets
will not be included in the company's bankruptcy estate. 2 As a result,
the bankruptcy risk that was present in the regular unsecured and se-
cured lending arrangements is not present in a true sale securitization.
Knowing that their investments will be "remote" from the company's
potential bankruptcy proceedings, investors are willing to pay a higher
price for securitized assets than they will for an unsecured debt obliga-
tion, all else being equal. In other words, securitizations allow compa-
nies to raise capital at a lower cost than they can through unsecured
loans. For example, a company that cannot borrow unsecured at in-
vestment-grade interest rates may now be able to raise capital at those
rates through securitization.'3 Likewise, a company that already may
borrow at investment-grade rates will now be able to raise capital at
even lower rates.'"
Such financing advantages have led companies to continue
searching for more and more items to securitize. Securitization of ex-
ecutory future flows seems to be the next logical step.5 Executory fu-
ture flows consist of the future revenue stream of an asset.M Executory
future flows are not assets; they are cash flows dependent on some
10 Steven L. Schwarez, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fm 133,135-
36 (1994) ("Bankruptcy remote in this context means that the SPV is unlikely to be adversel af-
fected by a bankruptcy of the [debtor]."). By structuring a securitization through a bankruptcy-
remote SPV the debtor ensures that the SPV will not become part of the debtor's estate if the
debtor should enter into bankruptcy.
11 See Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the UCC as Applied to Securitization: Char-
acterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer as a Sale or a Secured Loan, 73 BU L Rev 873,886 (1993)
("If a court determines that the transfer ... was an outright sale, then the buyer of that loan [or
other securitized asset]-by definition-retains all of the legal and equitable interests in the
loan, and thus the court will not include the loan in the seller's [bankruptcy] estate.").
12 Once the assets are sold in a securitization, they are no longer "legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor," thus excluding them from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See 11 USC
§ 541(a)(1) (1994).
13 See Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 137 (cited in note 10) (describing how an SPV's
bankruptcy remoteness can give a company financing power similar to an investment-grade
credit rating).
14 See id.
15 See Richard Gugliada, New Developments in Securitization 1998: Structured Finance
Ratings Asset-Backed Securities New Assets 1998, 781 PLIIComm 511, 611-14 (1998) (citing the
fact that Standard & Poor's expects future flow transactions to increase, and offering a possible
structure and list of legal concerns for future flow securitizations); Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus &
Fin at 152-53 (cited in note 10) (describing the possibilities for future flow securitizations as
"nearly limitless" and listing several examples of possible future flows to securitize).
16 Gugliada,781"PLI/Comm at 611 (cited in note 15) (defining future flow securitizations).
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event occurring in the future that creates an asset." Whether the event
creating the asset will ever occur is uncertain; therefore, it is uncertain
whether the executory future flows will ever be realized. It is true that
assets such as receivables also represent future cash flows. The differ-
ence is that the event upon which the cash flows depend has already
occurred.'8 Executory future flows have yet to accrue on a company's
balance sheet. One can characterize them as future receivables or fu-
ture future cash flows.
A concrete example best serves to illustrate an executory future
flow securitization. Suppose an oil company is seeking capital to fi-
nance the extraction of a newly discovered oil field. Its engineers are
convinced that the field will produce $50 million worth of oil. The
company seeks a less expensive financing option than traditional debt
financing, but at the same time does not want to issue equity in the oil
field since it prefers to keep all of the profits for itself. The company
decides to finance the extraction of oil from the field through a securi-
tization of the future receivables it will generate from the sale of that
oil. 9 In order to attain cheaper financing, the company would like to
structure the transaction as a bankruptcy-remote true sale. It wishes to
transfer the rights to all revenues from the oil field to an SPV in ex-
change for cash. The SPV will then sell securities to investors backed
by the revenues that will accrue from the future oil sales.
Several prominent future flow securitizations have already taken
place using a similar structure. In 1997, musician David Bowie issued
bonds backed by the future royalty income of his songs.2 In 1996,
Twentieth Century Fox raised $1 billion by securitizing future film
revenues."t Recently, a professional sports team announced its inten-
tion to finance a new arena by securitizing future ticket and conces-
sion sales revenue.n The one feature all these executory future flow
securitizations have in common is that although they are structured
through SPVs, they would probably be considered secured loans
rather than true sales.2
17 See Black's Law Dictionary 570 (West 6th ed 1990) (defining executory as "depending
upon a future performance or event").
18 While this difference may seem minute on its face, the question of when an asset is cre-
ated is essential to the bankruptcy law analysis of securitizations. See Part ILA, especially text
accompanying notes 75-77. See also 11 Usc § 541(a)(7).
19 See Gugliada, 781 PLlIComm at 611, 613-14 (cited in note 15) (describing natural re-
source harvesting as a future flow that would benefit from securitization).
20 Sam Adler, David Bowie $55 Million Haul: Using a Musician's Assets to Structure a Bond
Offeing, 13 Enter L & Fm 1 (Aug 1997).
21 See James Surowiecki, Gold into Led, Wired 77 (Sept 1998) (discussing entertainment-
based, asset-backed securities); Sylva, Comment, 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at
208 (cited in note 3).
22 Sylva, Comment, 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 208-09 (cited in note 3).
23 See id at 209 (discussing the fact that these executory future flow securitizations include
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For a variety of reasons, efforts to structure future flow securitiza-
tions as bankruptcy-remote true sales have proven unsuccessful. As a
result, companies have been unable to take advantage of bankruptcy-
remote financing for executory future flows. This Comment sets out
the difficulties in characterizing an executory future flow securitiza-
tion as a true sale and suggests a particular legal framework that prac-
titioners could use to structure executory future flow securitizations as
bankruptcy-remote true sales.
Part I defines the process of securitization and provides an ex-
panded description of the SPV's crucial role in making a securitization
a bankruptcy-remote true sale. Part II discusses the current state of
bankruptcy law as it concerns securitizations. Specifically, it addresses
pending legislation that, if passed, will affect the legal status of asset-
backed securitizations. It then seeks to predict how courts may treat
executory future flow securitizations in light of the fact that this legis-
lation would not apply to such transactions directly. Part III lays out
the legal barriers to structuring an executory future flow securitization
as a bankruptcy-remote true sale. Finally, Part IV proposes guidelines
for structuring an executory future flow securitization such that a
bankruptcy court would treat it as a true sale.
I. SECURITIZATION: AN EXPANDED DEFINITION
While there is no absolute definition of securitization,1 one
author has appropriately defined asset-backed securitization as the
"sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership interests
in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of as-
sets, in a transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks
inherent in owning or lending against the underlying assets.' 'u The
definition of an executory future flow securitization may be extrapo-
lated from this definition by replacing all references to "asset" with
"executory future flow." According to this definition, a securitization
is quite similar to a corporate bond. Both financial instruments allow a
company to receive cash up front in return for making structured
payments to investors at later dates. The difference is that in a regular
bond obligation the borrower makes its payment out of its general
"other assurances for investors including adequate credit enhancements that are designed to
kick in if and when an income stream evaporates"). The credit enhancements qualify as recourse
to the SPV and its investors that compensates for the risk that the executory future flows will
never materialize. As Part II.A will illustrate, the presence of this high level of recourse will
most likely cause courts to characterize these securitizations as secured loans rather than true
sales.
24 See Joseph C. Schenker and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex L Rev 1369,1373 (1991) (attempting to define securitization).
25 Id at 1374-75.
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pool of assets. In a securitization, on the other hand, the SPV meets its
obligation to investors solely out of a pool of specifically set-aside as-
sets (or future flows).6 By purchasing securitized assets that are sepa-
rated from the debtor's regular assets, SPVs and their investors re-
ceive assets that cannot be touched by creditors of the company in the
event that it declares bankruptcy.n2
A. The Structure of a Securitization
Securitizations adhere to a specific structure in the hopes of cre-
ating bankruptcy remoteness for the securitized items. A company at-
tempting to securitize its assets (or future flows), known as an "origi-
nator" 2 or a "seller,"'2 must first decide which assets it seeks to securi-
tize.nO A rational originator is advised to choose some of its highest
quality assets for securitization. The discount rate' at which an origi-
nator can raise capital in a securitization is determined by the qualityn
of the securitized assets and their ability to be bankruptcy remote. In a
regular corporate unsecured loan, the discount rate is determined by
the originator's overall creditworthiness.33 The originator only benefits
from securitization when it securitizes assets at a lower discount rate
than it could obtain from an unsecured loan. Consequently, the origi-
nator should only securitize its high quality assets and should try its
best to make the securitizations bankruptcy remote.
The originator's next step is to establish an SPV. The SPV must
be a separate legal entity from the originator. ' The SPV purchases the
assets that later will be securitized from the originator.3 Then the SPV
26 For the rest of Part I, I will refer to the items being securitized as "assets," in order to
simplify matters. Even though they are not assets, executory future flows can be securitized using
the same basic securitization structure described in this Part. In Part IV, I will propose a structure
that adapts this securitization process to meet the special concerns of executory future flows.
27 Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 135 (cited in note 10) (explaining the mechanics of
securitization).
2 Id.
29 See Robert D. Aicher and William J. Fellerhoff Characterization of a Transfer of Receiv-
ables As a Sale or a Secured Loan upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 Am Bankr L J 181,186
(1991).
30 See Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 135 (cited in note 10).
31 The discount rate refers to the percentage by which the nominal expected cash flow
from a securitized asset exceeds the amount for which the originator can sell the assets in a secu-
ritization. The lower the discount rate, the cheaper it is for the originator to raise capital via secu-
ritization.
32 In this context, "quality" refers to the probability that an asset will realize predicted cash
flows to the fullest extent and on schedule.
33 Lupica,76 Tex L Rev at 613 (cited in note 1). Note that the discount rate in a securitiza-
tion is analogous to an interest rate in an unsecured loan.
34 Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fm at 135 (cited in note 10).
35 See Michael . Cohn, Note, Asset Securitization: How Remote is Bankruptcy Remote?, 26
Hofstra L Rev 929,931 (1998) (describing the securitization process).
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issues securities backed by these assets to investors." Finally, the pro-
ceeds from the securities are used to pay off the purchase price of the
assets from the originator."
In order to entice the investors to purchase these securities, the
SPV must obtain a favorable credit rating ' from a rating agency on
the assets." The credit rating standardizes and quantifies the securities'
risks, allowing an investor to compare the risks of the SPV's securities
versus other possible investments.4' Also, the credit rating certifies the
quality of the securitized assets. A high credit rating allows the SPV to
issue securities at a lower interest rate, thus allowing it to reserve a
smaller amount of cash for repaying the debt. As a result, the SPV
pays the originator a higher purchase price for its assets; by definition,
this brings about a lower discount rate to the originator.41 Ultimately, it
is the lower discount rate that makes securitizations an attractive fi-
nancing option.
B. The Purpose of the SPV
The SPV serves three purposes. First, it is a pass-through' entity
that allows an originator's unique and illiquid assets to be transformed
into standardized and liquid securities that may be sold to investors.-
Second, the SPV serves to protect its own investors-the investors in
the securitized assets-from the SPV going bankrupt.' Third, the SPV
protects the securitized assets from third party claims, especially those
36 Id.
37 Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 135 (cited in note 10). Presumably, the SPV could also
borrow money to purchase the assets in full before selling the securities. When the securities are
finally sold, the SPV then would use the proceeds from the securities to pay off the loan.
38 One commentator describes credit ratings as follows:
Credit ratings reflect the likelihood that investors will be repaid their [initial] investment,
plus interest, on time and on the terms described in the transaction's offering documents,
and provide investors with a means to compare a variety of investment products. The lower
a security is rated, the higher risk it is deemed to be and thus the higher return paid. As
such, lower rated securities result in more expensive funding for their issuers..
Lupica,76 Tex L Rev at 611 (cited in note 1).
39 See Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fm at 136 (cited in note 10).
40 Id at 136-37.
41 Id at 136.
42 See Tamar Frankel, Securitization: The Conflict between Personal and Market Law
(Contract and Property), 18 Ann Rev Bank L 197, 211 (1999) (describing the three main pur-
poses of establishing an SPV).
43 Lupica, 76 Tex L Rev at 600 (cited in note 1), differentiates between "pay-through"
SPVs and "pass-through" SPVs. While the SPVs discussed in this Comment are technically "pay-
through" SPVs under Lupica's dichotomy, for the purposes of this Comment the term "pass-
through" merely means that the SPV serves as an intermediary between the originator and the
investors
44 Frankel, 18 Ann Rev Bank L at 211 (cited in note 42).
45 Id at 211-12. For a discussion of the SPV as a bankruptcy-remote entity in and of itself
see Part I.B.2.
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of the originator's creditors." Each of these purposes will be examined
in turn.
1. SPV as a pass-through to create liquidity.
In this context, an SPV acts as a pass-through entity in the sense
that the originator's assets must travel through the SPV in order for
the originator to raise capital from investors." Conceivably, an origina-
tor could directly issue securities that are backed only by a specific
pool of its assets (a "direct sale"). But such securities would be uncon-
ventional debt instruments. Investors would encounter difficulties
when trying to value them. Investors are familiar with traditional cor-
porate debt instruments, like corporate bonds and notes, which are
backed by the entirety of a company's assets. They know how to buy,
sell, trade, rate, and value these instruments since they encounter
many every day. With direct sale securities, an investor would incur
high transaction costs' in determining their value. These transaction
costs make direct sale securities effectively worth less than the compa-
rable conventional debt instruments even though they are backed by
the same assets. Securities whose values decrease solely because of the
transaction costs associated with them are known as "illiquid" securi-
ties. + One can therefore characterize the direct sale securities as hav-
ing less liquidity than traditional debt instruments.
The SPV solves the liquidity problem by transforming direct sale
securities into conventional debt instruments. Instead of selling its as-
sets directly, the originator sells its assets (to be securitized) to the
SPV.' The SPV then issues securities backed by its general pool of as-
sets. The SPV's general pool of assets is comprised solely of the assets
bought from the originator. Consequently, the SPV is effectively issu-
ing securities backed by only a selected portion of the originator's as-
sets, but in the form of a conventional corporate bond. By passing as-
sets through an SPV, the originator solves its liquidity problem.
46 Id at 211.
47 In the securitization context, the term "pass-through entity" does not refer to any form
of taxation or tax benefits whatsoever.
48 A transaction cost is the incidental cost incurred when one enters into an economic
transaction. It is independent of the economic values of the goods or services being exchanged.
For an extensive discussion of transaction costs, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J
L & Econ 1 (1960).
49 Illiquid means lacking liquidity. See Black's Law Dictionary 931 (cited in note 17) (de-
fining liquidity as "[t]he degree to which an asset can be acquired or disposed of without danger
of intervening loss in nominal value").
50 See Cohn, Note, 26 Hofstra L Rev at 931 (cited in note 35) (describing methods to es-
tablish bankruptcy remoteness through securitization).
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2. SPV as a bankruptcy-remote entity in and of itself
Investors in securitized assets face the risk that the SPV will de-
clare bankruptcy. The entire process of making sure the securitized as-
sets are remote from the originator's bankruptcy proceedings would
be moot if the SPV itself went bankrupt and was unable to pay off its
investors. In order to induce investors to purchase the SPV-issued se-
curities, the SPV's corporate charter must be set up in a manner that
makes bankruptcy nearly impossible.
First, the charter must limit the SPV's activities solely to pur-
chasing the originator's assets and issuing securities backed by these
assets." Since the SPV exists only for these purposes, it is a special
purpose vehicle. Limited to these special purposes, there should be no
situation outside of the securitization that could cause the SPV to go
bankrupt. The SPV engages in no other activities that would cause it
to take on liabilities. The only remaining risk of bankruptcy is if the
receivables held by the SPV go uncollected. Of course, the SPV's in-
vestors agree to bear this risk, which is represented to them in the
form of the credit rating. 2
Second, the charter must contain a provision stating that the
SPV's board of directors needs to have at least one independent direc-
tor.5 3 An independent director acts as a check on the SPV's board
(which is otherwise chosen by the originator) to ensure the board acts
in the best interests of the SPV's investors." Since the investors are
concerned with the bankruptcy-remote status of the SPV being com-
promised, the charter must provide that the independent director(s)
has veto power over board actions that jeopardize bankruptcy re-
moteness. These actions include the ability to file a voluntary bank-
ruptcy or insolvency petition; the ability to dissolve, liquidate, consoli-
date, merge, or sell substantially all of the SPV's assets; the ability to
engage in any business activity besides the specified special purpose;
and the ability to amend the SPV's organizational documents.5
Finally, the charter must provide that the SPV is prohibited from
merging with any entity that will not adopt the same bankruptcy-
51 Id at 933. If the purchase of assets is structured so that the SPV also has to borrow
money to make the purchase, the charter can contain a provision allowing the SPV to borrow
only for this specific purpose.
52 See notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
53 See Malcolm S. Dorris and Edward J. O'Connell, New Developments in Securitization:
Problem Cases in Bankruptcy, 732 PLI/Comm 99,105-06 (1995) (suggesting ways to ensure that
an SPV is "extremely unlikely" to be involved in a bankruptcy). See also Sylva, Comment, 15
Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 218-19 (cited in note 3); Cohn, Note, 26 Hofstra L
Rev at 932 (cited in note 35).
54 Cohn, Note, 26 Hofstra L Rev at 932 (cited in note 35).
55 Sylva, Comment, 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 218-19 (cited in note 3);
Don-is and O'Connell, 732 PLI/Comm at 105-06 (cited in note 53).
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avoiding provisions. 6 This clause protects the SPV from losing its
bankruptcy-remote status. More importantly, it leaves open the possi-
bility that an originator could merge its SPV into that of another
originator. This merger of SPVs creates a "multiseller securitization
conduit" ("MSC").f An MSC is advantageous since its multioriginator
nature reduces the likelihood that it will be considered the alter ego of
any one originator and be subject to consolidation.n MSCs are also
more attractive to investors since they are basically mutual funds, and
therefore serve to diversify investors' portfolios.
3. SPV as a protection from third party creditors.
This section illustrates the SPV's most important function: its
ability to remove assets from the originator's bankruptcy estate. The
bankruptcy code provides that the originator's (debtor's) bankruptcy
estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in prop-
erty as of the commencement of the case."'" By definition, a true sale
of property extinguishes all of the seller's legal and equitable interests
in the property. 6 Consequently, any property transferred from the
originator to an SPV in the form of a true sale is not included in the
originator's bankruptcy estate. The property is "bankruptcy remote."'
There are two distinct situations that could cause courts to con-
solidate the SPV's assets into the bankruptcy estate of the originator,
thereby thwarting an originator's attempt at bankruptcy remoteness.
These risks will be termed the separate entity risk and the characteri-
zation risk. If a securitization falls victim to either of these risks, the
SPV (and its investors/creditors) must compete with all of the origina-
tor's creditors during the bankruptcy proceeding for the originator's
remaining assets." The following describes each risk and the relevant
law that has shaped it.
a) Separate entity risk. If a bankruptcy court determines that the
SPV is not a substantially separate legal entity from the originator, it
may consolidate the SPV's assets with the originator's in the origina-
tor's bankruptcy estate. A key issue is whether the SPV is an "alter
56 See Sylva, Comment, 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 218 (cited in note 3);
Dorris and O'Connell, 732 PLIIComm at 105-06 (cited in note 53).
57 Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus &Fm at 140 (cited in note 10).
58 See Part I.B3.a.
59 11 USC § 541(a)(1).
60 See Mancini, Note, 73 BU L Rev at 886 (cited in note 11) (discussing the effect of the
true sale of an asset in the context of mortgage loan transfers).
61 Schwarcz, 1 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 135 (cited in note 10) ("Bankruptcy remote in this
context means that the SPV [meaning the SPV's property] is unlikely to be adversely affected by
a bankruptcy of the originator.").
62 See 11 USC § 544(a) (1994).
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ego" of the originator.' In determining alter ego status, courts inquire
into the relationship between two entities to determine whether they
truly are acting at arms' length.A
Traditionally, courts have ordered alter ego consolidations if two
conditions are satisfied. First, alter ego status must be established.
Second, the originator's creditors must show that they relied to their
detriment upon a belief that the originator and SPV were not separate
legal entities.6' A bankruptcy court will only invoke consolidation to
protect creditors if they have suffered a substantial harm.
Despite the significant burden of proof needed to demonstrate
alter ego status, the originator must still take steps to ensure that the
SPV functions as an independent legal entity. The Committee on
Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York has proposed a comprehensive list of fac-
tors to help determine whether an SPV is a substantially separate le-
gal entity.7 These factors, such as compliance with corporate formali-
63 See In re New Center Hospital, 187 Bankr 560,568-69 (Bankr ED Mich 1995) (describ-
ing the determination of alter ego status as "critical" to the analysis of consolidation in bank-
ruptcy).
64 Id at 569, citing In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co Ltd, 860 F2d 515 (2d Cir 1988). In New
Center Hospital, the court enunciated a seven-part test for determining alter ego status: "(1)
presence or absence of consolidated business or financial records; (2) unity of interest and own-
ership between the debtors; (3) the existence of parent and intercorporate guarantees on loans;
(4) degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining separate assets and liabilities; (5) exis-
tence of transfers of assets without observance of corporate or other legal formalities; (6) com-
mingling of assets and business functions; and (7) the profitability of consolidation at a single
principal location." 187 Bankr at 569.
65 See Augie/Restivo, 860 F2d at 518 (Detrimental reliance can be shown by demonstrating
that the creditors, in extending credit, did not rely on there being separate legal entities. Alterna-
tively, it may be shown by demonstrating that the affairs of the two entities are "so entangled
that consolidation will benefit all creditors."). See also In re American Way Service Corp, 229
Bankr 496,527 (Bankr S D Fla 1999) (providing a recent example of a substantial consolidation
under the "so entangled" standard).
66 See In re Snider Bros; Inc 18 Bankr 230, 234 (Bankr D Mass 1982) ("A review of the
case law reveals that equity has provided the remedy of consolidation in those instances where it
has been shown that the possibility of economic prejudice which would result from continued
corporate separateness outweighed the minimal prejudice that consolidation would cause."). It is
unclear how the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, which pertains to asset-backed secu-
ritizations, will, if enacted, affect this separate entity requirement. See note 69 and accompanying
text. As Part II.A points out, the bill does not address the issue. One likely interpretation is that
the new legislation does not require the SPV to be a separate legal entity in order for the assets
to avoid consolidation. Another possible interpretation is that because alter ego consolidation is
an equitable doctrine and the proposed legislation is silent on the issue, bankruptcy courts still
have the power to consolidate alter ego SPVs when it would be equitable to do so.
67 The factors are as follows: (1) The SPV's compliance with its corporate formalities; (2)
The separateness of SPV decisionmaking from that of the originator, (3) The separateness of
SPV operations from those of the originator; (4) Whether the SPV has actual possession of the
securitized assets; (5) The SPV's management of its liabilities; (6) The separateness from the
originator of the SPV's offices; (7) The separateness from the originator of the SPV's financial
statements; (8) The arms' length nature of the SPV's transactions with the originator and affili-
ates; (9) The extent of disclosure of the separateness of the SPV and its assets from the origina-
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ties, non-commingling of assets, and separate financial reporting, de-
scribe an SPV that has the necessary detachment to be able legiti-
mately to engage in an arms' length transfer of assets with the origina-
tor. By following these guidelines, the SPV can serve as a successful
vehicle to segregate securitized assets.
b) Characterization risk. Characterization risk is the risk that a
bankruptcy court will view the originator's conveyance of assets to the
SPV as a secured loan rather than as a true sale. Under this analysis, a
court could hold that the SPV has not "purchased" the originator's as-
sets, but rather has loaned money to the originator, secured by the se-
curitized assets. As a result, the SPV becomes a creditor of the origina-
tor. If the originator declares bankruptcy, the SPV, and consequently
the investors in SPV-issued securities, must compete with the rest of
the originator's creditors for a share of the originator's estate.6
The investors want to avoid this characterization risk. If courts
characterize a securitization as a secured loan, then investors would
have to endure the long time delays and repayment uncertainty asso-
ciated with bankruptcy proceedings. To avoid this situation, origina-
tors must find a securitization structure that eliminates the characteri-
zation risk.
To structure a securitization to avoid characterization risk, a prac-
titioner must be able accurately to predict when courts will invoke
their powers to characterize securitizations as secured loans. When it
pertains to executory future flow securitizations, this task is extremely
difficult because of the evolving nature of the law. Part II analyzes the
current state of bankruptcy law regarding asset-backed securitizations
with an eye towards ascertaining how the law relates to executory fu-
ture flow securitizations.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
The current state of bankruptcy law, as it pertains to asset-backed
securitizations, is in flux due to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000
("Reform Act")69 now pending in Congress. Among its many provi-
to, and (10) The separateness from the originator of the relationship between the SPV and third
parties such as contracting parties, creditors, and certificate holders. The Committee on Bank-
ruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus Law 527,559-60 (1995).
68 See Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 Geo Mason
U L Rev 287,307-10 (1991), for a complete discussion of the technical bankruptcy rules that al-
low for the securitized assets to revert to the originator's bankruptcy estate in this securitization-
as-secured-lending situation.
69 HR 833,106th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 24,1999), available online at <http'/ithoma&loc.gov>
(visited July 23, 2000); S 625, 106th Cong, ist Sess (Mar 16, 1999), available online at
<http://thomasloc.gov> (visited July 23,2000). While the House bill and the Senate bill differ in
other sections, Section 903 of each bill has identical provisions on asset-backed securitizations.
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sions, the Reform Act seeks to clarify how bankruptcy courts should
address the issue of true sale characterization. If passed, it will provide
clear legal boundaries for asset-backed securitizations. While the Re-
form Act does not extend to executory future flow securitizations, it
does provide a source of encouragement to originators seeking to
structure executory future flow securitizations as true sales.
A. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000
Section 903 of the Reform Act is titled "Asset-Backed Securitiza-
tions."7' If passed, it will amend Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,7'
which sets out what is and is not included in a debtor's bankruptcy es-
tate. Specifically, it will exclude from the bankruptcy estate "any eligi-
ble asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset
was transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of
the case, to an eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed secu-
ritization '." Under this legislation, an asset-backed securitization will,
with certainty, be considered a bankruptcy-remote true sale as long as
the transaction fits within the statutory definition of asset-backed se-
curitization.
The proposed Reform Act defines "asset-backed securitization"
as "a transaction in which eligible assets transferred to an eligible en-
tity are used as the source of payment on securities, the most senior of
which are rated investment-grade by 1 or more nationally recognized
securities rating organizations, issued by an issuer." This definition is
basically equivalent to the definition of asset-backed securitization of-
fered in Part 1.7'
The proposed Reform Act then goes on to define "eligible as-
sets" as
financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds
thereof), either fixed or revolving, including residential and
commercial mortgage loans, consumer receivables, trade receiv-
ables, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into cash
within a finite time period, plus any rights or other assets de-
70 HR 833 § 903 (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903 (cited in note 69).
71 11 Usc § 541.
72 HR 833 § 903(5) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(5) (cited in note 69).
73 HR 833 § 903(e)(1) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(1) (cited in note 69).
74 The only real difference is the requirement of an investment-grade credit rating of the
assets. In reality, however, this requirement only makes explicit in the definition what was al-
ready implicit. There was already a tacit requirement by investors that the assets have an
investment-grade rating; otherwise, investors would not buy into securitizations. See notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
1328 [67:1317
Securitization of Executory Future Flows
signed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds
to security holders.5
This definition appears broad, stating that virtually all types of assets
(and proceeds thereof) may be securitized. However, it is clearly not
intended to include executory future flows. As stated above, executory
future flows are not assets; they are proceeds from assets that may be
created in the future.7 6 As a result, executory future flows do not meet
the "financial assets" requirement for "eligible assets." Also, executory
future flows are distinct from the type of assets explicitly listed in the
definition. The enumerated assets, such as mortgage loans and con-
sumer receivables, are not executory because the events upon which
their accrual depend have already occurred (namely the issuance of a
mortgage loan and a sale of a good to a consumer, respectively)." Fur-
thermore, executory future flows do not "convert into cash within a
finite time period." For example, an asset such as a mortgage loan has
a strict monthly payment. As a result, it will convert into cash within a
finite time-a month. In contrast, the executory future flows from a
mortgage loan yet to be made do not convert into cash within a finite
time period because it is uncertain as to when and if the loan will be
made. If a loan is made tomorrow, it will convert into cash in a month
and a day, but if it is made eleven months from now, it will not convert
into cash for a year.
The Reform Act defines "eligible entity" as a "trust corporation,
partnership, or other entity engaged exclusively in the business of ac-
quiring and holding eligible assets, issuing securities backed by eligible
assets, and taking actions ancillary thereto. '' This definition simply
encompasses the traditional definition of an SPV,9 because an SPV is
an entity whose exclusive function is to acquire securitized assets and
issue securities backed by these assets.80
Since the Reform Act will most likely not extend to executory fu-
ture flow securitizations, there is still uncertainty as to how courts will
treat these securitizations. One might interpret the passage of the Re-
form Act as demonstrating a congressional intent to encourage all
75 HR 833 § 903(e)(2)(A) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(2)(A) (cited in note 69).
76 See notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
77 See note 18 and accompanying text.
78 HR 833 § 903(e)(3)(B) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(3)(B) (cited in note 69).
79 It is uncertain whether the proposed Act will require an SPV to be a separate legal en-
tity from the originator. The Act is silent on this issue. There is a strong argument, however, that
the separate entity requirement still exists. The debtor must "transfer" eligible assets to the eligi-
ble entity under proposed 11 USC § 541(b)(5). HR 833 § 903(l) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(5)
(cited in note 69). It seems implausible under the definition of "transfer" in 11 USC § 101(54)
(1994), which is "parting with property or with an interest," that the originator can truly "trans-
fer" an asset to its alter ego. The asset would not "part" with the originator.
80 See notes 34-37 and accompanying text for a description of an SPV's function.
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true sale securitizations, including executory future flow securitiza-
tions, even though executory future flows are not explicitly mentioned
in the Act. However, because of the unique legal questions surround-
ing executory future flow securitizations, which are discussed in Part
III, and because executory future flow securitizations will not be cov-
ered explicitly by the text of the Reform Act, the more likely intepre-
tation is that courts will give executory future flow securitizations a
higher level of scrutiny than asset-backed securitizations. This inter-
pretation is further supported by the fact that executory future flows
are not mentioned in the legislative history of the Reform Act. And,
as mentioned above, executory future flows are significantly different
from financial assets to such an extent that they cannot be lumped
into the "eligible assets" category of the Reform Act.8
As a result, one must look beyond the Reform Act and its legisla-
tive history to predict how courts will treat executory future flow se-
curitizations. One must look to case law. Since no case law has specifi-
cally dealt with executory future flow securitizations, the analysis must
be done by analogy, and must ascertain how courts have traditionally
considered transactions similar to executory future flow securitiza-
tions.
Part II.B analyzes how courts have traditionally scrutinized the
true sale/secured loan issue for transactions similar to executory fu-
ture flow securitizations to predict how future courts will scrutinize
executory future flow securitizations. This analogous case law will in-
form courts' decisions under both current law and the Reform Act.
B. The Case Law: True Sale Versus Secured Loan
The application of bankruptcy case law to securitizations remains
unclear, primarily because bankruptcy courts have never considered
whether securitizations constitute true sales or secured loans." Practi-
tioners must draw on the bankruptcy law of similar transactions, such
as direct sales of accounts receivable, and analogize this to securitiza-
tions.?
The secured loan/true sale issue was first illustrated by Major's
Furniture Mart, Inc v Castle Credit Inc,' a case where a furniture com-
81 See notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
8 See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 Tulane
L Rev 101, 108 (1997) (analyzing the doctrinal context of asset securitization). Courts have con-
sidered securitizations as they apply to other legal issues. See, for example, In re Kingston Square
Associates, 214 Bankr 713,714 (Bankr S D NY 1997) (considering securitizations in the context
of whether to uphold bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions made by the SPV's creditors);
In re Buckhead America Corp, 161 Bankr 11 (Bankr D Del 1993) (considering securitizations in
the context of single entity risk).
8 See Frost, 72 Tulane L Rev at 110 (cited in note 82).
8 602 F2d 538 (3d Cir 1979).
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pany transferred its accounts receivable to a finance company in ex-
change for cash.5 The Third Circuit stated that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code "does not provide assistance in distinguishing between the
character of such transactions. This determination, as to whether a
particular assignment constitutes a sale or a transfer for security, is left
to the courts for decision." Following this apparent delegation to the
courts, the Third Circuit held that the furniture company did not en-
gage in a true sale despite the company's characterization as such. The
Third Circuit characterized the transaction as a secured loan because
the furniture company guaranteed that the finance company would
receive its payments regardless of the collectability of the receivables;
this guarantee took the form of various types of security.
The Third Circuit offered bankruptcy courts some guidance in
distinguishing a sale from a transfer for security, stating that they must
look beyond the transacting parties' characterization of the transac-
tion and instead ascertain whether the "true nature of the transaction
[is] such that the legal rights and economic consequences of the
agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction or to a
sale." Under the proposed Reform Act, this statement would no
longer apply to asset-backed securitizations. Instead, asset-backed se-
curitizations will be characterized as true sales if the originator simply
states its intent to create a true sale, regardless of whether the under-
lying nature of the transaction is actually that of a true sale.9 This is by
far the most radical departure the Reform Act makes from the cur-
rent case law.
Since Major's Furniture Mart, courts have further developed the
true sale/secured loan doctrine. They have looked to several factors in
deciding the issue. The following factors are pertinent to this Com-
ment.
1. The intent of the parties as evidenced by their writings.
Unsurprisingly, the first factor courts often consider in character-
izing a transaction is the intent of the transacting parties. In deter-
mining the true intent of the parties, courts may look at parol evi-
dence' in addition to the written agreements between the parties.1
85 Id at 539.
86 Id at 543.
87 Id at 545-46.
88 Id at 544.
89 See HR 833 § 903(e)(5) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(5) (cited in note 69). These sec-
tions state that an originator can create a true sale merely by "represent[ing] and warrant[ing]
that eligible assets were sold"
90 "Oral or verbal evidence ... which is given by word of mouth" Black's Law Dictionary
at 1117 (cited in note 17).
91 See In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc, 23 Bankr 659,661 (Bankr D Me 1982) (holding
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"The court should examine the parties' conduct, practices, objectives,
business activities, and relationships."' After examining the evidence,
it is up to the court's discretion to determine the parties' true intent.?
In In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc, a bankruptcy court stated that
"[it is clear that an assignment may operate to transfer a security in-
terest, rather than absolute ownership, if it is intended to create a secu-
rity interest."95 However, the converse of this statement, that an as-
signment may transfer absolute ownership if the parties intend it, is
not true given the ruling in Major's Furniture Mart.6
Nonetheless, the transacting parties' intent, though currently not
sufficient to create a true sale, does seem to be a necessary require-
ment for a true sale. If the transacting parties do not intend a true
sale, a court would be hard pressed to find any reason to characterize
their transaction as such. The transacting parties would not benefit
from this characterization against their wills, and neither would any
third parties.
2. The absence of'recourse against the originator.
Another factor courts consider is recourse. Recourse, in this con-
text, is defined as the remedy the SPV has against the originator if the
securitized receivables go into default.9 Recourse can take many
forms, such as an originator's obligation to repurchase the defaulting
receivables,9 an originator's cash-backed guarantee that the receiv-
ables will be collected, or the SPV's ability to withhold cash payment
to the originator until the corresponding receivables are collected.'® A
that a court "is not restricted to an examination of the written agreement").
92 Id. See also In re Lemons & Associates; Inc, 67 Bankr 198,209-10 (Bankr D Nev 1986).
Thd court looked to brochures advertising the transaction as a "sale," in addition to the transac-
tion agreement itselt to determine whether the parties intended a sale. Ultimately, the parties'
intent was one of several factors that led the court to characterize the transaction as a true sale.
Id.
93 See, for example, Lemons & Associates, 67 Bankr at 209-10 (deciding the intent of the
parties); Evergreen Valley, 23 Bankr at 661 (same).
94 23 Bankr 659 (Bankr D Me 1982).
95 Id at 661.
96 602 F2d at 546.
97 If the Reform Act is passed, intent will be the only factor courts look at for asset-backed
securitizations.
98 For a formal definition of recourse, see Black's Law Dictionary at 1275 (cited in note 17)
(defining recourse as: "[t]he right of a holder of a negotiable instrument to recover against a
party secondarily liable, e.g., prior endorser or guarantor.").
99 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000 specifically allows a securitization to be a true sale
even if the originator maintains a repurchase obligation. See HR 833 § 903(e)(5)(B) (cited in
note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(5)(B) (cited in note 69). Nonetheless, it is doubtful that a bankruptcy
court will require the originator to fulfill its repurchase obligation once it files for bankruptcy
because it is an executory contract subject to 11 USC § 365(a) (1994) (A debtor has the right to
"assume or reject any executory contract" in bankruptcy.).
100 See Aicher and Fellerhoff Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables, 65 Am Bankr L
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securitization transaction may be characterized as a true sale even if
the SPV maintains some degree of recourse from the originator to
cover the defaults of the assets purchased.' °' Even if the SPV has "full
recourse"2 against the originator, the transaction can still be charac-
terized as a true sale. '
Nonetheless, the existence of significant recourse is the single
greatest factor that leads courts to characterize transactions as secured
loans. ' Courts have reasoned that a purchaser who maintains substan-
tial recourse does not bear the risks of ownership. In Major's Furniture
Mart, the Third Circuit held that a transaction where accounts receiv-
able were (1) sold with a reserve from the purchase price held back by
the buyer to cover uncollected accounts and (2) sold with a provision
forcing the seller to buy back any delinquent accounts within sixty
days resembled a secured loan more than a true sale.'n The purchaser
bears none of the risks of ownership in this type of transaction, in-
cluding the risk that the accounts are in default. For this reason, the
court disregarded the parties' characterization of the transaction as a
true sale, and instead characterized the transaction as a secured loan."6
In In re Woodson Co,'O a seller of receivables paid the purchaser
the value of receivables as they came due, whether or not they were
actually collected."" The court held that the transaction was a secured
loan since the seller relieved the purchasers of "all risk of loss.....
Similarly, in In re S.O.A.W. Enterprises, Inc,t ° the seller was obligated
to "repurchase" the receivables sold to the purchaser if these receiv-
ables were in default, and was obligated to put up collateral against
J at 186 (cited in note 29) (analyzing the factors that affect a court's determination of whether a
transaction is a sale or a loan).
101 See UCC § 9-502 cmt 4, 3B Uniform Laws Annotated (West 1992) ("IT]here may be a
true sale of accounts or chattel paper although recourse exists").
102 Full recourse is recourse equal to or exceeding the total amount of receivables pur-
chased.
103 Major's Furniture Mart, Inc v Castle Credit Corp, Inc, 449 F Supp 538, 542-43 (E D Pa
1978), affd, 602 F2d 538 (3d Cir 1979) (rejecting contention that the existence of a full recourse
provision "automatically transforms any sale of accounts into a transfer of a security interest").
104 See Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F2d at 540. See also In re Woodson Co, 813 F2d 266,
271-72 (9th Cir 1987) (characterizing investments in which the debtor relieved the investors of
all risk of loss as not being sales); In re &O.A.W. Enterprises; Inc, 32 Bankr 279,283 (Bankr W D
Tex 1983) (finding an agreement in which the debtor was absolutely obliged to repurchase the
creditor's investment to consist of a normal debtor/creditor relationship and not a sale).
105 602 F2d at 540,545-46.
106 Id.
107 813 F2d 266 (9th Cir 1987).
108 Id. See also In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc, 119 Bankr 199, 200-01 (BAP 9th Cir 1990)
(holding a transaction to be a loan and not a sale where the risk of loss is shifted from the inves-
tor to the debtor through a guarantee of repayment), affd, 42 F3d 1181 (9th Cir 1994).
109 Woodson Co, 813 F2d at 271.
110 32 Bankr 279 (Bankr D Tex 1983).
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these defaults.'" The court characterized this agreement as a secured
loan.
In contrast, In re Golden Plan of California12 held that a contract
for the purchase of assets, which was clearly marked "WITHOUT
RECOURSE" and which in fact had no "contractual guarantee of re-
payment or compensation in case of foreclosure [upon the accounts
receivable]," was a true sale.' 3 While lack of recourse is not sufficient
on its own to create a true sale, executory future flow securitization
practitioners should pay close attention to this case. The lesson to be
learned is that a securitization intended to be structured as a true sale
should, if at all possible, contain a "no recourse" provision.
3. The right to a surplus of the securitized assets.
A securitization could be structured so that the purchase price
that the SPV pays to the originator is discounted by the expected de-
fault rate on the receivables purchased."'4 For example, the securitized
assets may represent a present value of $100, with a 10 percent default
rate. The SPV, accounting for the expected default rate, would pur-
chase the assets for $90. A few months down the road when the assets'
cash flows are realized, only a 5 percent default rate is realized. The
SPV would realize a $95 value on its $90 purchase, representing a $5
surplus.
It seems logical that if the SPV purchased the asset through a
true sale, it would be allowed to keep this surplus as a benefit of own-
ership. If, on the other hand, the SPV made a secured loan to the
originator, then the SPV would return the surplus, since the originator
is only obligated to pay back the loan amount. Courts support this
reasoning by holding that if the surplus is returned to the originator,
"a security interest is indicated."".
4. The extent of the originator's continuing obligation to the SPV
after the transfer of assets.
When an originator assigns its accounts receivable to an SPV,
there is a legal question as to the extent that the originator may re-
main involved with the accounts. On one view, if the originator has
truly "sold" its accounts, it should have little or no further involvement
with them. Once the originator has received the purchase price, it
M Id at 281-83.
112 829 F2d 705 (9th Cir 1987).
113 Id at 709-11.
114 See Lupica, 76 Tex L Rev at 639-40 n 235 (cited in note 1) (listing factors courts have
identified as relevant when determining whether a transaction is a true sale or a secured loan).
115 Evergreen Valley, 23 Bankr at 661.
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should have little interest in whether the accounts are actually col-
lected, since only the buyer should bear the uncollectability losses.
Two cases support this view. In Petron Trading Co v Hydrocarbon
Trading & Transport Co,16 the court declined to uphold a true sale
when an assignor continued to prepare invoices for contract payments,
did not notify its account debtor that its debt had been assigned, and
retained rights under the assignment contract to petition the account
debtor for price adjustments."' Similarly, in In re Major Funding
Corp,"8 the court characterized a transaction where the assignor col-
lected mortgage receivables and then paid the proceeds out to its in-
vestors/assignees as a secured lending arrangement rather than a true
sale."9 The court focused on the fact that the assignor did not segre-
gate specific receivables to pay its investors, but rather paid each in-
vestor a specified return from its general pool of mortgage receiv-
ables.' The return amount was not linked to the collectability of any
particular mortgage or mortgages, but was instead a guaranteed fixed
amount paid out from the general pool. Notably though, while holding
against the assignor, the Major Funding court did not object to the as-
signor acting as collection agent for the assignees.
Complementing these two cases is the view that if an originator
acts as a mere collection agent and processor for the SPV, and nothing
more, then a true sale may still exist. The Reform Act is consistent
with this view.'2 ' This view accounts for the fact that the originator has
a closer relationship to its account debtors than does the SP. It is
more efficient for the SPV to hire the originator as its collection and
administration agent than to collect and administer the accounts by it-
self-
Golden Plan supports this view. ' The case involved a transaction
very similar to a securitization. A mortgage loan company assigned its
mortgage loans to a subsidiary, which in turn assigned them to inves-
tors.'20 As part of the assignment agreement, the investors signed a
form contract, drawn up by the mortgage lender, that named a collec-
tion agent. The collection agent's duties were (1) to collect monthly
payments from the mortgage borrower, (2) to forward the payments
116 663 F Supp 1153 (E D Pa 1986).
117 Id at 1159.
118 82 Bankr 443 (Bankr S D Tex 1987).
119 Id at 449.
120 Id at 448.
121 See HR 833 § 903(e)(5)(B) (cited in note 69); S 625 § 903(e)(5)(B) (cited in note 69).
122 See 829 F2d at 709.
123 This structure differs from the securitization transaction discussed in this Comment be-
cause instead of having the subsidiary sell securities backed by its assets, it sold the assets di-
rectly.
2000] 1335
The University of Chicago Law Review
to the investor, and (3) to handle any paperwork needed if a mortgage
was foreclosed.'
The court stated that "[s]uch loan collection agreements suggest
that the ... investors, rather than [the mortgage lender or the collec-
tion agent], actually owned the note."12 On the court's theory, if the in-
vestors did not own the mortgage loan receivables, they would not
have contracted for their collection. Instead, the mortgage loan com-
pany would have still owned the receivables and would have had to
make its own arrangements for their collection.
The Golden Plan court held that the mortgage lender and collec-
tion agent were mere "intermediaries" between the mortgage borrow-
ers and the investors.'26 The fact that the seller had control over the
collection and administration process did not alter the true sale char-
acterization because the court held that the intent of both the mort-
gage lender and the investors was to execute a true sale, the agree-
ment was clearly marked "WITHOUT RECOURSE," there was in
fact no recourse, and the investors bore all the risk of loss.'"
After Petron Trading, Major Funding, and Golden Plan, the legal
landscape, as it relates to the originator's continuing obligation, seems
quite clear.' As long as all the other factors that constitute a true sale
are satisfied (such as the absence of price adjustment rights, the segre-
gation of assets, proper intent, proper risk bearing, and lack of re-
course), then the fact that the originator or its agent merely acts to
collect and administer receivables for the SPV should not jeopardize
the true sale characterization.
5. The equitable powers of bankruptcy courts.
Even if a securitization overcomes all other legal hurdles, there is
still the risk that a bankruptcy court will use its equitable powers to
consolidate the SPV into the originator."9 In Norwest Bank Worthing-
ton v Ahlers," the Supreme Court stated that "whatever equitable
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exer-
cised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code..3. Section 105(a) of
124 Golden Plan, 829 F2d at 709.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id at 709-10.
128 This probably explains the lack of recent litigation on the issue.
129 The risk is quite small, but it still needs to be addressed.
130 485 US 197 (1998).
131 Id at 206. If the Reform Act is passed, Norwest Bank would prevent courts from using
their equitable powers to characterize an asset-backed securitization as a secured loan. But, since
the Reform Act is silent on the alter ego issue, one can argue that even under the Reform Act
bankruptcy courts may still use their equitable powers to consolidate alter ego SPVs into the
originator's bankruptcy estate.
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the Bankruptcy Code provides the statutory authority that grants
bankruptcy courts their equitable powers. The provision states that
"[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 'l This pro-
vision applies in all bankruptcy cases.
'"A review of the case law reveals that equity has provided the
remedy of consolidation in those instances where it has been shown
that the possibility of economic prejudice which would result from
continued corporate separateness outweighed the minimal prejudice
that consolidation would cause. ' 3  Under this prejudice-balancing test,
if the prejudice to the originator's creditors is large, and the corre-
sponding prejudice to the creditors of the SPV-the investors-is
small, a bankruptcy court has the power to consolidate the SPV into
the originator's bankruptcy estate."
Fortunately for originators, bankruptcy courts have exercised
their equitable powers narrowly.' In light of the case law, there must
be more than mere prejudice to third party unsecured creditors in or-
der for courts to order equitable consolidation. Only in the extreme
case where this prejudice is combined with something like the lack of
separate entities- or frauda will courts be inclined to order this rem-
edy. Nonetheless, practitioners should at least be aware that bank-
ruptcy courts do have equitable powers that could come into play with
regard to executory future flow securitizations.
Having described the current state of bankruptcy law as it may
pertain to executory future flow securitizations, this Comment now
turns to the problems the law presents for executory future flow secu-
ritizations.
132 11 USC § 105(a) (1994).
13 In re Snider Bro4 Inc, 18 Bankr 230,234 (Bankr D Mass 1982) (holding that consolida-
tion was not warranted when maintaining separateness would not cause significant harm or
prejudice).
134 For a detailed discussion of the effects of securitizations on third party unsecured credi-
tors, see Lupica,76 Tex L Rev at 616-58 (cited in note 1).
135 See In re Auto-Train Corp, Inc, 810 F2d 270,277-78 (DC Cir 1987) (refusing to consoli-
date a subsidiary's assets into its parent's bankruptcy estate on the ground that the subsidiary's
creditors faced detrimental reliance). See also In re DRW Property Co, 54 Bankr 489, 495-97
(Bankr N D Tex 1985) (endorsing the prejudice-balancing test mentioned above in denying a
consolidation request and stating that the detriment to the creditors of a subsidiary would out-
weigh the benefit of consolidation to the parent's unsecured creditors).
136 See Lupica, 76 Tex L Rev at 645 (cited in note 1).
137 See id at 647-48.
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III. THE DIFFICULTY IN STRUCTURING EXECUTORY FUTURE FLOW
SECURTIZATIONS AS TRUE SALES
In discussing the difficulties with structuring an executory future
flow securitization as a true sale, this Comment will revisit the oil
company example set out in the introduction. The oil company will
have to overcome the following legal hurdles, derived from the case
law described in Part II.B, in order for courts to enforce this transac-
tion as a bankruptcy-remote true sale: (1) compensating investors for
the extra risk associated with executory future flows without offering
recourse; (2) minimizing the originator's continuing obligation; (3)
dealing with a sale or merger of the originator; and (4) dealing with
bankruptcy courts' equitable powers.
A. The Need to Compensate Investors for the Extra Risk
Future flow securitizations add an extra layer of potential risk to
the investor that is not present in a regular asset-backed securitiza-
tion. This is the risk that future flows will not occur at the level prom-
ised by the debtor, or in extreme cases, that the flows will not occur at
all. In the oil company example, this risk includes the possibility that
the oil field will not produce as much oil as the engineers expect or
that the field might even be dry, the possibility that oil prices will drop,
making the cash flow from the field smaller than the expected $50
million, and the possibility that new environmental laws will raise
costs or restrict pumping.
To attest to investors that these risks are not too great, an SPV
must obtain an investment credit rating on the securitized future
flows. The credit rating assures investors of the high likelihood that
the executory future flows will occur at their predicted rate and quan-
tity.'9 There is a caveat to the credit rating. "[A] credit rating ... as-
sesses a likelihood of payment on financial obligations [but] does not
necessarily reflect the probability of continued production.'1 39 As a re-
sult, investors in the future flow securitization will demand assurances
that the oil company will continue to produce oil as expected. In the
past, these assurances have taken the form of either straight recourse
or overcollateralization.'"
Straight recourse can be a company-backed cash guarantee that
the $50 million inflows will be realized, or a promise by the company
to indemnify the investors if their predictions about the field were
wrong. Since there is recourse against the originator, the SPV and its"
138 See Gugliada,781 PLI/Comm at 611 (cited in note 15).
139 Id.
140 See id at 612-13 (describing the methods used in a future flow securitization to over-
come risks within an industry).
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investors do not bear the risk of loss associated with ownership. Con-
sequently, in such situations courts will characterize the securitization
as a secured loan rather than a true sale.'
Overcollateralization would exist if the SPV sold only $40 million
worth of securities backed by a right to receive all of the future flows
on the $50 million field. If the entire field underperformed by $10 mil-
lion, the investors would still get paid in full. Plus, the originator would
retain any yield above $40 million, so as not to lose money on the deal.
Overcollateralization would be very unlikely to pass the legal test
of being a true sale. Clearly the investors do not bear the risks associ-
ated with ownership of the field, since all losses on the oil field are
borne by the originator (assuming the originator picks an overcollat-
eralization amount well in excess of any foreseeable loss the oil field
could incur). Furthermore, the investors do not receive the benefits
from owning all the future flows, since the originator retains all flows
in excess of $40 million. An originator must find some structure in
which the extra risks of future flow assets are accommodated without
using recourse and without denying the investors the benefits and
risks of ownership.
B. The Continuing Obligation of the Originator
If the oil company were securitizing receivables representing oil
already sold, a ceasing of its business activities would have no eco-
nomic effect on investors in the securitization. The receivables ac-
crued already through the company's past sales activities are not de-
pendent on any future business activities. In an executory future flow
securitization, however, investors are dependent on the company con-
tinuing to extract and sell oil.
The oil company's continuing obligation presents a difficult bank-
ruptcy law issue not encountered with asset-backed securitizations.
Section 541(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate includes "[a]ny interest in property that the estate ac-
quires after the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.'' If the oil
company goes into bankruptcy during the oil harvesting period, this
provision comes into play; the oil company will be acquiring oil after
the commencement of the bankruptcy case. In order to prevent this oil
(and the proceeds thereof) from being included in the bankruptcy es-
tate, and to preserve bankruptcy remoteness, it must be demonstrated
141 See text accompanying notes 99-103.
142 11 USC § 541(a)(7). Clearly, this provision does not apply to asset-backed securitizations.
In an asset-backed securitization, the originator has already acquired a "property interest" in the
assets at the time of securitization by the mere fact that it must own the assets in order to sell
them in an asset-backed securitization.
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that the oil company's harvesting of oil does not constitute an "inter-
est in property." One must argue that the property interest in the oil
yet to be harvested was already property of the SPV by virtue of a sale
to the SPV prior to the originator's bankruptcy; the originator, by con-
tinuing to harvest the oil, does not obtain a property interest in the oil
but merely acts as the analogue of a collection agent. The originator
merely "collects" the oil and "administers" the sale of the oil and the
transfer of the sale proceeds to the SPV. One must analyze the case
law on continuing obligations in order to better inform this argument.
As demonstrated by Golden Plan, a court will allow a true sale
when the originator's only continuing obligation is merely to collect
and administer receivables." However, the duty to extract and sell oil
for ten years is a much more substantial obligation. During the next
ten years the oil company will have to make numerous decisions
about price, quantity to be extracted per year, and percentage of its
overall resources to devote to the particular oil field. It may be diffi-
cult for a court to conclude that the SPV "owns" the future flows
when it is the originator that makes all of the decisions as to the qual-
ity and quantity of the future flows. Since the SPV stands idly by and
collects its money, the SPV seems more like a secured lender than an
entity with a true ownership interest. For example, in Petron Trading
the court made a secured loan determination because the seller re-
tained the right to alter prices received from its accounts without con-
sulting the buyer.I" The reasoning was that the seller had too much
control over the sold item to characterize the transaction as a true
sale.
Control seems to be the theme that underlies both Golden Plan
and Petron Trading. Where the originator acts as a mere agent to pass
on the future flows, a true sale is still in order. But where the origina-
tor acts to control the quality and quantity of the future flows, courts
will likely characterize the transaction as a secured loan.
C. The Sale or Merger of the Originator
The risk that the originator will be bought or merged is relevant
to future flow securitizations. In a regular asset-backed securitization,
the assets sold have already accrued and consequently are independ-
ent of any future mergers of the originator. In contrast, executory fu-
ture flow securitizations are dependent on the future activities of the
originator. As a result, transactions involving executory future flows
143 See 829 F2d at 709 (finding a true sale when the originator real estate lender merely
served as a collection intermediary after transferring the loans to a group of investors).
144 663 F Supp at 1159.
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will have to consider how to treat an originator whose assets are pur-
chased or merged during the life of the transaction.
Using the oil company example again, suppose that Exxon buys
substantially all of the assets of the oil company in order to obtain ex-
tra drilling machines to extract oil from its more lucrative fields. These
extra drilling machines previously were used to extract oil from the
securitized field. As part of the deal, Exxon must acquire the securi-
tized field, but since it has more lucrative fields, it intends to hold the
securitized field in reserve for the next twenty years.
The legal question is whether Exxon, while not a party to the se-
curitization, must assume the oil company's duties to continue to ex-
tract oil from the securitized field, or whether it may use the acquired
equipment on other fields and let the securitized field lay fallow.
Characterizing it differently, should the SPV, as owner, bear the loss of
discontinued drilling due to Exxon's purchase? Or should Exxon be
forced to honor the securitization agreement?
D. The Equitable Powers of Bankruptcy Courts
Bankruptcy courts may use their equitable powers to characterize
a future flow securitization as a secured loan rather than a true sale.
As noted above, bankruptcy courts use their equitable powers spar-
ingly, usually in cases of fraud or alter ego. This Comment proposes
that there are at least two other scenarios that may cause bankruptcy
courts to invoke their equitable powers.
First, they may invoke their powers if the debtor's ability to reor-
ganize may be harmed. For example, consider a situation where the oil
company is having trouble obtaining a loan that is necessary for it to
successfully reorganize. A bank will only give it a loan if it begins har-
vesting oil from oil fields other than the securitized field, because the
bank wants the oil company to generate cash that is unencumbered by
the executory future flow securitization. Unfortunately, the oil com-
pany only has enough equipment to harvest from one field at a time.
Under this scenario, a bankruptcy court could invoke its Section 105
equitable powers, on the belief that it is against public policy to reor-
ganize a company that has a positive going concern value, and order
the oil company to stop harvesting the securitized field.
This equitable scenario is analogous to another situation in bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy law allows for a cancellation of a security interest
in the debtor's equipment when the debtor must use that equipment
to reorganize successfully in bankruptcy."5 The creditor would still get
145 See United States v Whiting PooL Inc, 462 US 198 (1983) (requiring the IRS to return
the debtor's equipment, even though the IRS had a property interest in the equipment, because
the equipment was necessary for the debtor's reorganized business).
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adequate protection for the equipment, ' but would have to wait out
the entire bankruptcy process.'" The theory behind this law is that the
benefit of the debtor's reorganization outweighs the creditor's right to
the equipment. Similarly, a bankruptcy court might argue that the
benefit of the oil company's reorganization outweighs the harm to the
oil company's executory future flow investors of staying their claims.
Assuming the investors are treated as secured creditors, they will
likely receive adequate protection, but they still must endure the
lengthy bankruptcy process.
Second, executory future flow securitizations are a peculiar en-
cumbrance to anyone interested in purchasing the originator. Con-
sider again the case where Exxon wishes to purchase the oil com-
pany's assets and put the purchased machinery to other uses. If Exxon
is required to assume the oil company's future flow securitization
agreement, either it will be forced to put assets to a suboptimal use, or
it will choose not to engage in an otherwise profitable purchase of the
oil company.
Thus, a bankruptcy court may discharge the continuing obligation
of the debtor in the executory future flow securitization in order to fa-
cilitate the sale of the debtor as a going concern in bankruptcy. It is
uncertain where this discharge leaves the securitization's investors.'4
IV. A PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE
EXECUTORY FUTURE FLow SECURITIZATIONS
This Part proposes possible solutions to the problems posed in
Part III. By aggregating these solutions, a loose structure for distin-
guishing a true sale from a executory future flow securitization can be
formed.
A. Compensating for the Extra Risk without Compromising True
Sale Status
The extra uncertainty associated with future flow securitizations
• • • 149
decreases their value as compared to asset-backed securitizations.
Courts will not allow these risks to be eliminated by recourse while
still preserving true sale status. Instead of offering recourse, future
146 The creditor will receive an interest in property equal to the value of the equipment. See
11 USC § 363(e) (1994) (granting courts the power to protect such interests).
147 11 USC § 362(a)(3).
148 The securitization investors will likely get some share of the price at which the debtor is
purchased. They may even recoup their entire claim. But, in a sense, these investors have already
lost; the securitization is no longer bankruptcy-remote since the investors must endure the
lengthy bankruptcy proceeding in order to collect on their claims.
149 For example, the ability to receive $50 million for certain is worth $12.5 million more
than a mere 75 percent chance of receiving $50 million.
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flow securitizations should account for risks in their price. If risks
make future flow securitizations less valuable, originators should sim-
ply charge a lower price. Courts likely will uphold this method, since
no recourse is present, and the price will be fair.
The problem with this structure is that if the price falls too low,
the originator may no longer have an economic advantage from rais-
ing capital through securitization. As a result, future flow securitiza-
tions will be viable only for those originators who have extremely cer-
tain future flows and can therefore still charge a high enough price to
make securitization a viable option. These are the originators with in-
vestment-grade future flows, such as telephone companies, local mu-
nicipalities, and natural resource companies, ' ° where the risk of not
generating future flows is so slim that they can borrow at investment-
grade interest rates.
B. Solving the Continuing Obligation Problem
The securitization agreement should explicitly limit the extent to
which the originator has "control" over the future flows. The agree-
ment needs to limit the originator's ability to make decisions about
price, quantity, and allocation of resources that concern its future
flows. The idea is to give bankruptcy courts the sense that the origina-
tor is merely a pass-through entity'51 that must necessarily engage in
some administrative tasks, but in no way usurps the SPV's ownership
rights.
Using the oil company example again, the best way to prevent the
originator from making decisions throughout the life of the securitiza-
tion is to contract for these decisions ex ante. For example, the securi-
tization agreement can specify that the securitized oil field should ac-
count for 10 percent of the originator's total extraction activities per
year. It can also state that the oil company must extract and sell a cer-
tain amount of oil from the securitized field each year, and that it must
immediately sell the oil at the prevailing market rate on the day it is
sent to market. Once all variables are contracted for ex ante, the origi-
nator looks more like it is merely administering the future flows ac-
cording to specifications of the securitization agreement.
C. Accounting for the Sale or Merger of the Originator
A future flow securitization agreement must provide that the
originator will require its acquirer to assume the terms of the securiti-
zation upon purchase. This is the only structure in which the SPV in-
150 See Gugliada, 781 PLIIComm at 611-14 (cited in note 15), for a description of the fac-
tors Standard & Poor's considers in determining a future flow securitization's credit rating.
151 See text accompanying note 47.
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vestors can be assured payment under the securitization. The origina-
tor can no longer make payments, since it no longer exists.
D. Preventing a Bankruptcy Court's Use of Its Equitable Powers
Courts may exercise their equitable powers in order to ensure the
successful reorganization of the debtor. In considering whether to use
their equitable powers, courts will use a balancing test to decide
whether the benefit of successful reorganization exceeds the harm to
the executory future flow investors. It would be very hard to argue
that the investors are so severely harmed so as to prevent the success-
ful reorganization of the debtor. The investors are sophisticated, usu-
ally insurance companies or other institutional investors, and are
therefore probably able to absorb these risks.
A better argument would be for the investors to argue that bank-
ruptcy courts should not interfere with executory future flow securiti-
zations on public policy grounds. The argument would be that all types
of securitizations are efficient, and bankruptcy courts should not use
their equitable powers to interfere with such efficient transactions.
The academic debate as to whether the securitization transaction
in general produces an overall economic efficiency remains unre-
solved."2 Advocates of the efficiency justification state that securitiza-
tions offer a cheaper source of borrowing, increased liquidity of assets,
better management of the risks associated with receivables, elimina-
tion of the need to waste extra assets on collateral, lower monitoring
costs for creditors, and a general increase in the availability of credit.'"
The proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act is evidence that, to some de-
gree, Congress buys this efficiency argument. Detractors of the effi-
ciency justification argue that any efficiency gains of the securitization
are offset by the corresponding premium an originator's unsecured
creditors will demand in compensation for their heightened risks."
While there is no definitive resolution to this debate, the fact that an
originator engages in a future flow securitization demonstrates its be-
lief that the efficiency gains of the securitization outweigh the extra
costs it will incur in attracting future unsecured creditors. It is true that
the originator's current unsecured creditors will suffer losses. But ab-
sent some showing of extreme prejudice, such as fraud, towards these
unsecured creditors, courts should honor a properly structured future
flow securitization as a true sale.
152 For a general discussion of literature on the efficiency of securitizations, see Lupica, 76
Tex L Rev at 616-31 (cited in note 1).
153 See id.
154 Id at 619-20.
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CONCLUSION
It remains uncertain whether bankruptcy courts are willing to
characterize executory future flow securitizations as bankruptcy-
remote true sales. What is certain is that the advent of bankruptcy-
remote executory future flow securitizations would benefit a host of
diverse industries. The prototypical company for using executory fu-
ture flow securitizations is one with expected future cash flows from a
presently illiquid asset, a high certainty of realizing these future cash
flows, and the need for a large amount of capital as a condition to re-
alizing these future flows. Industries that fit this description include
natural resources harvesting, manufacturing of patented drugs, and en-
tertainment copyright royalties. Future flow securitizations will allow
these and other industries to grow and prosper by providing a cheaper
source of capital and solving liquidity problems. Ultimately, this story
of growth and prosperity should persuade bankruptcy courts not to
invoke their equitable powers of consolidation. Additionally, a legal
structure with a discounted price to investors, no recourse, and as
minimal a continuing obligation as can be contracted for ex ante
should make it difficult for courts to characterize such transactions as
anything but true sales agreements.
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